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Moore v. Regents of the University of
California: Doctor, tell me moore!

INTRODUCTION

Complex biotechnology research is vital to modem society
because of the possibilities that research presents for curing disease,
improving human health and increasing medical and scientific
knowledge.' This research is not without cost, and it depends on
stable, accessible sources of cellular and genetic material for
continuing study and advancement.2 In the area of human cell
research, the need for human cell sources gives rise to challenging
questions regarding how, and at what price, these cell sources
should be secured. Intimately associated with such questions is the
issue of the nature and extent of an individual's property rights in
the individual's own body. Finding useful answers to these
questions calls for complex legal analysis of both property and tort
law, as well as thorough consideration of appropriate social, ethical
and legal policies.
The California Supreme Court recently addressed some of these
questions in the case of Moore v. Regents of the University of
California.' The plaintiff in Moore alleged that he had a property
interest in his excised spleen and tissue which defendants had used
in commercially profitable medical research.4 The California

I.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), New Developments in
Biotechnology: OwnershipofHuman Tissues andCells (1987) at 3 (discussing policy issues involved

with the use of human biological materials).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120,793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 146 (1990), rehearing denied August 30, 1990, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
4. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 125, 793 P.2d at 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
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Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeal,5 held that no
property right existed.6 The Court further held that a physician has
a fiduciary duty to inform a patient of any personal interest the
physician has in the patient's treatment.7 Although the Moore
decision partially addressed the concerns of the particular plaintiff
involved, it has also provided a breeding ground for a multitude of
future cases involving the commercial use of human bodily tissue.
This Note explores the California Supreme Court's resolution
of the issues presented in the Moore case. Part I presents a
background to the major legal concepts employed by the Court in
reaching its decision.' Part II summarizes the facts of the case and
reviews the various opinions produced by the Court.9 Part I
suggests some of the potential legal ramifications of the Moore
decision and posits some of the questions which remain
unanswered after Moore."°
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Traditionally, the law has not recognized a specific cause of
action addressing the deprivation of property rights in one's own
tissue." In fact, the question of whether property rights even exist
in human tissues and cells was largely ignored by the common
law. 2 One explanation for the lack of legal interest in this area is
that historically, human body tissue, as a commodity, has had no

5. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (2nd Dist. Cal. 1988) (previous cite 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230), superseded by, 51 Cal. 3d
120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
6. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 11-101 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 102-286 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 289-331 and accompanying text.
11. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 9.
12. Id. The idea that there are no commercial pioperty rights in the human body first
developed in the English ecclesiastical courts and was later carried over into the Common Law
courts. Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 Bus. LAw. 919, 922 (1968). Cf. Comment,
Spleenfor Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University of California andthe Right to Sell PartsofYour
Body, 51 OHio ST. LU. 499, 503 (1990) (noting that the common law occasionally characterized
living bodies as property, as in the attachment of a debtor in payment of the debt).
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real commercial value.1 3 However, as demonstrated by the Moore
case, new medical technologies have made some human cells
extremely valuable. 14 Now that developments in biotechnology
research have brought these issues before the courts, the judiciary
must resolve disputes by analogizing to precedent derived in other
circumstances.1 5 The Moore decision is an example of this
reasoning process.
To better understand the California Supreme Court's decision,
a review of relevant case law and pertinent statutes relied on by the
Moore court will be helpful. The Moore court focused primarily on
two areas of the law, informed consent in the doctor-patient
relationship and the tort of conversion."
A. Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent embodies the general
principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose to his
patient all substantial risks associated with a particular medical
treatment.' 7 The purpose behind the informed consent doctrine is
to enable the patient, who is faced with choosing among or
refusing various treatments, to assess both the risks and benefits8
and to make an intelligent judgment about medical care.'
Once effective consent is given, the patient is not entitled to a tort
recovery for harm resulting from the conduct to which he
consented.' 9
13. Havens, A Patient'sCommercial Interests in the Productsof Genetic Engineering:The
Brave New World of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 36 MED. TRiAL TECHNIQUE
QUAR. 137, 146 (1990).
14. Id.
15. OTA Report, supra note I at 9.
16. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 128-47, 793 P.2d 479,
483-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150-64.
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (Abr. 5th ed. 1983). See also RESTATEmENT (SECOND)
OF TORT § 892B(i) (1979) (discussing informed consent).
18.

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 399 (Abr. 5th ed. 1983).

19. See RSTAMET (SECOND) Op TORT § 892A (1979) (discussing effect of consent).
Section 892A reads, in pertinent part:
(1) One who effectively consents to the conduct of another intended to invade his interests
cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.
(2) To be effective, consent must be...
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The leading California case on the issue of informed consent is
20
the 1972 California Supreme Court decision of Cobbs v. Grant.
In Cobbs, the plaintiff underwent surgery to remove a duodenal
ulcer. 2' During surgery, the plaintiff sustained injury to his spleen,
a risk inherent in the procedure, necessitating its removal in a
subsequent operation.' Shortly after the second operation, and as
a result of the removal of the duodenal ulcer, the plaintiff
developed a gastric ulcer that was treated by a third operation in
which a large part of his stomach was removed.' After being
discharged from the hospital, the plaintiff began bleeding internally
as a result of the third operation and a fourth hospital stay was
required to treat this problem.2
All of the complications suffered by the Cobbs plaintiff were
risks inherent in the course of treatment prescribed.' However,
because the probability of any of these risks materializing was
quite small, 26 the defendant surgeon had not discussed such risks
with the plaintiff.27 The plaintiff brought an action for malpractice
alleging negligence by the surgeon and, alternatively, that
plaintiff's consent was ineffective because of the defendant's
failure to inform him fully of the risks inherent in the original
operation.
At trial, the jury rendered a general verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.29 The Supreme Court of California, however, found the
evidence insufficient to support a finding of negligence.30 Since

(b) to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.
Id.
20. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
21. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
22. Id. at 235, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
23. Id. at 235, 502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Spleen trauma results in about five percent of these cases. Id. at 235, 502 P.2d at 4, 104
Cal. Rptr. at 508.
27. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508. The Court noted, however, that the
defendant surgeon did explain the general nature of the operation to the plaintiff prior to obtaining
a standard written consent. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
28. Id. at 235-36,502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
29. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
30. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
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it could not be determined whether the jury had relied on the
negligence theory or the informed consent theory in reaching its
guidelines for
decision, the case was reversed and remanded with 31
jury instructions on the nature of informed consent.
In the Cobbs opinion the California Supreme Courtset forth
principles for determining the effectiveness of a patient's consent
to medical treatment. 32 Specifically, the Cobbs Court concluded
that a physician has an obligation to apprise the patient of all
available choices regarding any prescribed course of therapy and of
the potential risks of each choice. 33 The physician must also
disclose any additional information which a skilled practitioner of
good standing would ordinarily provide.34 The standard employed
by the Cobbs Court for deciding whether a particular risk must be
disclosed to the patient is whether the risk would have a material
effect on the patient's judgment.35
Additionally, the Court indicated that a plaintiff must show a
causal relationship between the injury sustained and the tainted
consent.36 In order to satisfy this requirement, the Court used an
objective test; the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position would not have consented to the
treatment if full disclosure had been made. Of course, the
plaintiff must also allege that the plaintiff would not have
consented to the procedure if the plaintiff had known all the
relevant facts.3" The issue does not rest solely on the plaintiff's

31. Id.
32. Id. at 242-45, 502 P.2d at 9-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513-15.
33. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The physician is not required to make
full disclosure if the patient is incompetent or incapable of evaluating the information. Id.
34. Id. at 244-45, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
35. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. Protection of the patient's right to
autonomous decision-making is the primary consideration upon which the physician's duty to disclose
is based. Id. See Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980)
(physician must divulge both the risks of having treatment and not having treatment).
36. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
37. Id. at 245,502 P.2d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16. The Court was unwilling to rely
exclusively on the plaintiff's testimony that he would not have consented to the treatment if he had
known of the risk. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. Justice would not be served by
placing the defendant physician at the mercy of the plaintiff's hindsight at trial, after the potential

risk had materialized. Id.
38.

Id.
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credibility,39 however, and for that reason the objective test was
mandated.
The Court in Cobbs determined that the right to weigh the risks
and benefits and give consent to a course of treatment belongs
ultimately to the patient, not the physician.' The Cobbs case
continues to be the standard on informed consent, and serves as the
foundation for the Moore Court's informed consent analysis.
B. The Tort of Conversion
The tort of conversion has its roots in the old common law
action of trover.4" To maintain an action in trover, the plaintiff
had to allege that he was possessed of certain goods, that he had
lost the goods, that the defendant found the goods and instead of
returning them, the defendant converted the goods to his own
use.42 It is from this final part of the pleading that the tort of
conversion derived its name.43
Gradually, the elements of losing and finding the goods came
to be seen as a legal fiction and were no longer required." Hence,
the plaintiff needed only to demonstrate the plaintiff's right to
possession and the actual conversion of the item by the
defendant. 45 The underlying theory of conversion was that the
defendant must pay for his usurpation of the plaintiff's chattel, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to damages amounting to the full
value of the chattel at the time of conversion.46 Upon satisfaction
of the judgment, title passed to the defendant. 47 Effectively, a

39. Id.
40. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
41. See PROSSER & KEEroN, THE LAW OF ToRm § 15 at 89 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing
conversion). See generally Prosser,The Nature of Conversion, 42 CoRN L.Q. 168 (1957) (discussing
the tort of conversion).
42. See PROSSER & KEmToN, supra note 41, § 15 at 89.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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conversion action could be viewed as a forced sale of the goods to
the defendant.4"
Modem law restricts the tort of conversion to situations
involving serious interference with the plaintiff's possessory rights
in the goods.4 9 The Restatement Second of Torts defines
conversion as an intentional exercise of dominion or control over
the property of another which justifies restitution to the property
owner.5" To establish a cause of action for conversion, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he owns the property allegedly converted,
that the property was wrongfully taken and that damages were
sustained.51 The Restatement outlines various significant factors
for determining if a conversion exists.52
The California Supreme Court reviewed the tort of conversion
in a well-known case, Poggi v. Scott. 53 In Poggi, the plaintiff
tenant brought a conversion action against his landlord after the
defendant landlord had unwittingly sold as junk some two hundred
barrels of wine belonging to the plaintiff.54 The Court concluded
that the defendant had assumed unjustified control over the wine
barrels which resulted in a loss to the plaintiff. 5 The defendant's
intent and lack of knowledge of the plaintiff's interest in the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 89.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 222 A (1965). That section states:
(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so
seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be
required to pay the other the full value of the chattel (2) In determining the seriousness
of the interference and the justice of requiring the actor to pay the full value, the
following factors are important:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control;
(b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other's right
of control;
(c) the actor's good faith;
(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other's right
of control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel;
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.
Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

PRossER & KEETON, supra note 41, at 88-106.
RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 222A(2), supra note 50.
167 Cal. 372, 139 P. 815 (1914).
Id. at 372, 139 P. at 815.
Id. at 376, 139 P. at 816.
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barrels, or the value of the contents, were irrelevant to the
conversion cause of action.56 Conversion, the Court stated, rests
on the defendant's unjust tampering with the plaintiff's property
and the resultant injury to the plaintiff.57 Based on the allegations
summarized above, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had
adequately plead a cause of action for conversion and was entitled
to take his case to a jury."
California cases in more recent times have established the
elements of the tort of conversion to be: (1) plaintiff's ownership
or right to possession of the property at the time of conversion; (2)
defendant's conversion by a wrongful action or disposition of
plaintiff's property rights; and (3) damages.59 Interpreting
California law, the Ninth Circuit discussed these factors in the case
of Tyrone Pacific International,Inc. v. MV Eurychili.6° There it
was noted that conversion is defined as any wrongful act of
dominion over another's personal property inconsistent with the
other's rights therein.6 Further, in City of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court2 it was recognized that the tort of conversion is a form of
strict liability.63 Thus, inquiry into the defendant's good faith,
64
motive, or lack of knowledge is inappropriate.
In analyzing the tort of conversion as employed in the Moore
case, it is necessary to determine what types of property interests
are convertible. Recall that at common law, the conversion action

56. Id. at 375, 139 P. at 816.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 376, 139 P. at 816.
59. See, e.g., Tyrone Pacific International, Inc. v. MV Eurychili, 658 F.2d 664,666 (9th Cir.
1981) (citing Hartford Financial Corp. v. Bums, 96 Cal. App. 3d 591,598, 158 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172
(1979)) (carrier's refusal to issue bills of lading to shipper was a wrongful act of dominion over
shipper's property). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 3336 (West 1970) (discussing the presumption
relating to damages for conversion of personal property).
60. 658 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1981) (interpreting the elements ofconversion under California law
and the proper measure of damages under California Civil Code section 3336).
61. Tyrone, 658 F.2d at 666.
62. 85 Cal. App. 3d 143, 149 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1978) (charging conversion of property seized
for nonpayment of taxes).
63. City of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 149, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
64. Id.
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contained the fiction of losing and finding property.0 Therefore,
any tangible chattel which was capable of being lost and found
could be converted.' Real property and the fixtures attached to
it could not be converted since these things could not be lost.6
However, once the fixtures had been severed from the land, they
became personal property and were considered capable of
conversion.'
Similarly, intangible property was at one time thought to be
unconvertible since it could not be lost or found.' Case law
expanded the conversion action to include documents which held
intangible rights, such as promissory notes, checks, and stock
certificates.7" Later, the conversion action was further expanded
to include intangible rights where a vital tangible, object had been
converted, for example savings bank books and insurance
policies.71 Eventually, conversion was allowed where no tangible
item accompanied the intangible rights, such as where a corporation
refuses to register a shareholder stock transfer on its books.'
There is a dearth of case or statutory law on the issue of
73
whether a convertible property interest exists in the human body.
However, courts have recognized a limited sort of property right
regarding dead bodies.74 That is, courts have granted a type of

65. See supra notes 42,44 and accompanying text (discussing the losing and finding fiction
embedded in the tort of conversion).
66. See PROSSER & KEnToN, supra note 41, § 15 at 90 (discussing conversion).

67.

Id.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id.

72.

Id. Prosser notes that the expansion of the conversion action has been limited to intangible

rights that are customarily associated with some type of document. Id. at 92. However, there seems

to be no essential reason why there might not be conversion of other intangibles such as the goodwill
of a business or an idea. Id.
73. See Note, Ownership ofHuman Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 75 VA. L REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1989).
74. Id. at 1364.
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property right to the next of kin of the deceased to determine how
the body will be disposed of.75
The California Supreme Court recognized this right in the 1899
case of O'Donnell v. Slack.76 Mrs. O'Donnell, a widow,
successfully petitioned for leave to take the body of her deceased
husband to Ireland for burial in accordance with his dying wish.7 7
The Court stated that although the body of a decedent is not part
of the decedent's estate, the decedent does have enough of a
proprietary interest to allow for valid testamentary disposition of
his own body.73 The Court went on to find that the next of kin
has a protectable property interest in the body of the deceased.79
Mrs. O'Donnell was granted a quasi-property right in her husband's
body, entitling her to recover if that right was interfered with."0
More recently, in Cohen v. Groman Mortuary Inc.,81 a case
concerning negligent mishandling of a body for burial, it was stated
that although there is no property right per se in the body of a
deceased person, a quasi-property right of possession is recognized
for the limited purpose of arranging for burial.8 2
There is a lack of authority for the proposition that convertible
property rights attach to living humans or to their excised tissue.
The possibility of such property rights existing was alluded to in
a Maryland criminal case, Venner v. State. 3 The defendant in
Venner had swallowed balloons filled with narcotics in an attempt
to avoid confiscation of the drugs by the police." Later, the

75. A number of cases recognize a quasi-property right in dead bodies. See, e.g., Sinai Temple
v. Kaplan, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 127 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1976); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary Inc., 231
Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964); Gray v. Southern Pacific Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240,68 P.2d
1011 (1937); Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900); O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285
(1899). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West Supp. 1990) (concerning right to
control disposition of remains).
76. 123 Cal. 285, 55 P. 906 (1899).
77. Id. at 290, 55 P. at 907.
78. Id. at 288, 55 P. at 907.
79. Id. at 289, 55 P. at 907.
80. Id.
81. 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964).
82. Id. at 4, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
83. 30 Md. App. 599,354 A.2d 483 (1976), affirmed, 279 Md. 47,367 A.2d 949 (1977), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 932, 97 S. Ct. 2638 (1977).
84. 354 A.2d at 486.
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defendant passed the balloons, which were found in his
excrement.8 5 In ruling on whether the balloons were property
abandoned by the defendant, the court stated in dicta that "[I]t
could not be said that a person has no property right in wastes or
other materials which were once a part of or contained within his
body ....,86 The Venner court held that in the instant case,
however, the defendant had shown no intent to assert a right to
ownership over his excrement and, therefore, intended to abandon
7

it.8

It is against this background that the Moore Court considered
and ultimately rejected the possibility of a property right existing
in the cells excised from John Moore's body, and denied a
conversion right of action. 8 However, the Court did not rely
solely on hornbook conversion law. The decision also reviewed
pertinent statutory law in an effort to determine legislative intent
about the existence of property rights in excised cells.8 9
C. Statutory Law Reflecting Property Rights in the Human Body
There are few statutes which directly address the issue of
property rights in the human body. One prominent example is the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), drafted in 1968 by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in response to the
increasing need for transplantation organs, and subsequently
adopted in some form by all fifty states."° The UAGA can be
viewed as legislative recognition of the quasi-property right extant

85. Id.
86. 354 A.2d at 498. The court went on to state that under generally accepted social principles
these materials would be discarded and would be considered legally abandoned. Id. at 498-99.
87. Id. at 499.
88. See infra notes 144-186 and accompanying text (discussing the conversion analysis in
Moore).
89. See infra notes 167-172 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore majority's review
of statutory law).
90. R. ScoTr, THE BODY As PRoPERTY 71 (1981). See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1968)
U.L.A. §§ 1-11 (West 1983).
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in the human body.91 This is exemplified by the statute's express
authorization of post-mortem devises of one's own body and body
parts.

92

The UAGA provides that any individual may make an
anatomical gift, effective at the donor's death, for certain purposes93
such as transplantation and the advancement of medical science.

The UAGA as written by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1968 did not address the subject of payment for body
parts. 94 However, the 1987 amended version of the UAGA, which
was adopted in California, specifically forbids the sale or purchase
for valuable consideration of organs for purposes of transplantation
or therapy.95 The more troubling issues, presented in the Moore
case, of intervivos sale of body parts and tissues are not covered by
the Act, which addresses only the use of the organs after the
donor's death. 96
California has also enacted legislation which regulates the
disposition of certain human biological materials.97 These statutes
are based on legislative policies concerning dignified and sanitary
disposition of human bodies and tissues, rather than on traditional
property law. 98 For example, California Government Code section
91. Comment, Regulating The "Gift of Life" - The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65
WASH. L. REv. 171, 181 (1990) (discussing the 1987 UAGA and its implications for Washington
law).
92. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7156.5 (West Supp. 1991) (codifying
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act).
93. Id. § 7150.5 (West Supp. 1991) (concerning making or refusing to make anatomical gifts
by an individual). See id. § 7153(a) (West Supp. 1991) (purposes for which anatomical gifts may be
made).
94. See R. Scotr, supra note 90, at 72. See Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23
Bus. LAW. 919, 928 (1968) (discussing the difficulty inherent in drafting a statutory provision
precluding payment and advising that until the payment question becomes a problem of large
dimension, it should be left to the decency of intelligent human beings); Cohen, Increasing the
Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a FuturesMarket, 58 G.W. L. REv. 1, 32-36 (1989)
(proposing the creation of a market for transplantable organs).
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155(a) (West Supp. 1991). Reasonable payment for
removal, processing, storage, preservation and other costs is apparently acceptable. Id. § 7155(b)
(West Supp. 1991).
96. See Comment, supra note 91, at 177.
97. See infranotes 98-103 and accompanying text (discussing California legislation concerning
disposition of human biological materials).
98. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d at 137,793 P.2d at 489,271
Cal. Rptr. at 156.
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27491.46 permits retention of human pituitary glands following an
autopsy, for purposes of university research or growth hormone
manufacture by a public agency. 99 California Government Code
section 27491.47 allows the coroner to remove corneal tissue if,

among other conditions, the coroner has no knowledge that the
deceased would have refused consent to the removal."oo The
coroner may also retain tissues after an autopsy for research or

educational purposes if specified statutory conditions are met and
consent is obtained from the patient or an authorized source."' 1
Health and Safety Code section 7054.4 prescribes the proper
procedure for disposal of human tissues, remains, and infectious
waste after scientific use of these items has been completed.

2

It should also be noted that California permits the transfer of
human blood, and that consideration is appropriate in such a
transfer. 103

As previously stated, there is no statutory law directly
responding to the issues raised in the Moore case. The Moore
Court was restricted to reviewing the few statutes concerning

99. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27491.46 (West 1988).
100. Id. § 27491.47 (West 1988).
101. See id. § 27491.45 (West 1988) (retention of body tissues for investigation; removal of
body parts for transplant, or therapeutic, or scientific purposes pursuant to the UAGA).
102. CAL. HEALTH SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp 1991) (providing that human remains
must be disposed of by incineration, internment or other method). See Id. § 7054.3 (West Supp. 1990)
(mandating disposal of dead human fetus by internment or incineration).
103. See CAI. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1603.5-1606 (West 1990) (relating to procurement
and distribution of human blood). Generally, the transfer is termed a service rather than a sale in
order to avoid liability for contaminated blood under either the Uniform Commercial Code or general
principles of product liability. Id. § 1606 (West 1990). See also Note, Hepatitis,AIDS andthe Blood
ProductExemption from Strict Products Liability in California:A Reassessment, 37 HAsTINGS LJ.
1101, 1109-11 (1986) (proposing that immunity from strict liability should not extend to
manufacturers of blood products). The courts are aware that avoiding strict liability is the reason for
this fiction; the property law ramifications of a transfer seemingly are unaffected by the "'service"
terminology. See, e.g., Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509,514,220 Cal.
Rptr. 590, 592-93 (1985) (holding that procurement of blood products is a service and that strict
liability was therefore not applicable); Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hospital, 62 Cal. App. 3d 812,
816, 133 Cal. Rptr. 339, 340-41 (1976) (holding that application of California Health and Safety
Code section 1606 to bar recovery for patient who allegedly contracted hepatitis from contaminated
blood did not violate equal protection); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 33 Cal. App. 3d 606,
611, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (1973) (strict liability not imposed for hospital transfusion of
contaminated blood since hospitals are not in the business of producing or marketing blood).

279

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
specific body parts for clues as to the legislative intent in the area
of human body property rights.
II. THE CASE
A. The Facts
On October 5, 1976, plaintiff John Moore visited the Medical
Center at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)
seeking treatment for a form of cancer known as hairy-cell
leukemia."M Moore was treated by Dr. David W. Golde, who
recommended removing Moore's spleen in order to treat the
disease. 5 Moore consented to this surgery."°
Prior to the operation, Dr. Golde and Shirley G. Quan, a
researcher at UCLA, determined that Moore's cancerous cells were
uncommon and that Moore's blood and blood components would
be commercially valuable. 7 Golde and Quan arranged to receive
portions of Moore's excised spleen for use in future research
projects unrelated to Moore's medical treatment. 8 Although
Moore signed the standard consent forms in anticipation of the
splenectomy, he was not informed of Golde's research plans, and
he did not consent to the use of his bodily parts or substances in

104. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 125,793 P.2d 479,480,
271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1990). Hairy cell leukemia, or leukemic reticuloendothcliosis, is a rare,
usually chronic disorder characterized by a proliferation of "hairy" cells (probably B-lymphocytes)
in certain organs and blood. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1225 (24th ed. 1982).
105. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126,793 P.2d at 481,271 Cal. Rptr. at 148. Dr. Golde was the head
of the Hematology-Oncology Department at the UCLA Medical Center and an expert on hairy-cell
leukemia. Note, supra note 73, at 1365.
106. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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that research.0 9 The splenectomy was successfully performed at
the UCLA Medical Center in October of 1976.110

During the period between November 1976 and September
1983, Moore made a number of follow-up visits to UCLA from his
home in Seattle at the direction of Dr. Golde, who allegedly made
false representations that the visits were necessary to Moore's
medical treatment.111 On each of these occasions, Dr. Golde
withdrew additional samples of blood, blood serum, skin, bone
marrow aspirate, and sperm in furtherance of his own research. 12
From the initial splenectomy and subsequent biopsies, Golde
and Quan isolated Moore's T-lymphocytes 1t 3 and cloned a cell
line" 4 that overproduced lymphokines" 5 as a result of infection
by human T-cell leukemia virus type II (HTLV-I). 116 The cell

109. Id. In September 1983, while unaware of the commercial value of the research, Moore
signed a consent form allowing removal of blood samples which "may be used for the purpose of
scientific investigation." See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 215 Cal. App. 3d 709,
769 Appendix B (consent of John Moore). This consent form stated: "I (do/do not) voluntarily grant
to the University of California any and all rights I, or my heirs, may have in any cell line or any
potential product which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from me.'"
Id.
110. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148. Moore used the term
"blood and bodily substances'" in his complaint to refer to all bodily tissue, including cells, spleen,
blood and genetic material. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 215 Cal. App. 3d
709, 709, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 494 (1988). Hereinafter this Note will use the term "cells" as a generic
term encompassing all of these items.
111. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
112. Id.
113. A lymphocyte is a type of white blood cell formed in lymphoid tissue throughout the
body, such as the spleen and tonsils, and sometimes in bone marrow. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 104, at 816. A T-lymphocyte, or T cell, is of great immunological
importance. Id.
114. A cell line is a sample of cells that has undergone the process of adaptation to artificial
laboratory cultivation and is capable of sustaining continuous, long-term growth in culture. OTA
Report, supra note 1, at 158.
115. Lymphokines are soluble substances, released by sensitized lymphocytes on contact with
specific antigen, which helps cellular immunity by stimulating activity of monocytes and
macrophages. STmMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 104 at 817. One of these is "immune"
(antigen) interferon. Id.
116. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 127,793 P.2d 479,48182, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148-49.
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line, named the Mo cell line, was patented on March 20, 1984.117

The patent listed Golde and Quan as the inventors of the Mo cell
line and the Regents of the University of California (Regents) as
the assignee.1 18

Between 1981 and 1983 the Regents and Golde secured
agreements with Genetics Institute, Inc. (GI) and Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Sandoz) for commercial exploitation
of the Mo cell line and its derivative products. 9 Although the
value of the Mo cell line is difficult to establish, Moore alleged
that it has a potential market value of about three billion
dollars.120 In September of 1984, Moore sued Golde, Quan, the
Regents, GI, and Sandoz alleging thirteen causes of action
including conversion of property, lack of informed consent, and
breach of fiduciary duty."'

The superior court sustained the defendants' demurrers to each
cause of action, reasoning that the first cause of action, conversion,
was defective and that the remaining causes were insufficient to
state a claim because they incorporated by reference the conversion
cause of action."' The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that an individual has a property right in his own bodily materials
117. Id. Some of the products of the Mo cell line are: colony-stimulating factor (CSF); Immune
interferon (type II); T-cell growth factor (TCGF, interleukin II); and neutrophil migration-inhibitory
factor (NIF-T). See U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984) (claiming various methods of using
the cell line to produce lymphokines).
118. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149. See U.S. Patent No.
4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984) (Mo cell line patent).
119. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127-28, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149. The agreement with
GI made Golde a paid consultant with rights to 75,000 shares of common stock. Id. GI further agreed
to pay Golde and the Regents at least $330,000 over three years, including a pro-rata share of
Golde's salary in exchange for exclusive access to the Mo cell line and its derivative products. Id.
Sandoz was later added to the agreement and the compensation payable to Golde and the Regents
was increased by $110,000. Id.
120. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 482,271 Cal. Rptr. at 149. See supra note 117 (products of the Mo
cell line).
121. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128, n.4, 793 P.2d at 482, n.4, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149, n.4. Moore's
complaint alleged all of the following causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) lack of informed consent;
(3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) fraud and deceit; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) quasi-contract; (7) bad
faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (8) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (9) negligent misrepresentation; (10) intentional interference with prospective
advantageous economic relationships; (11) slander of title; (12) accounting; and (13) declaratory
relief. Id.
122. Id. at 128, 793 P.2d at 482-83, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149-150.
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and that Moore's complaint was adequate to state a cause of action
for conversion.123 The District Court of Appeal also remanded the
case to the superior court for an express ruling on the remaining
twelve causes of action.124 The defendants appealed to the
California Supreme Court for a ruling on the denial of defendants'
demurrers.

25

B. The Majority Opinion
On July 9, 1990, the California Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeal, holding that while Moore had stated a cause of
action for lack of informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty, he
had not stated a cause of action for conversion. 126 The case was
remanded to the Court of Appeal for direction to the superior court
to overrule Golde's demurrers to the breach of fiduciary duty and
lack of informed consent causes of action. 127

123. Id. at 128, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The Court of Appeal agreed with the
superior court that the allegations against GI and Sandoz were insufficient, but directed the superior
court to give Moore leave to amend. Id. See also Moore v. Regents of the University of California,
215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988).
124. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
125. Since the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of ruling on
demurrers, the factual questions of the case have yet to be addressed.
126. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 125,793 P.2d at 480,271 Cal. Rptr. at 147. The case produced four
separate opinions. Justice Panelli wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and
Justices Eagleson and Kennard concurred. See id. at 124-48, 793 P.2d at 480-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
147-64. Justice Arabian wrote a separate concurrence. See id. at 148-50, 793 P.2d at 497-98, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 164-65 (Arabian, J., concurring). Justice Broussard wrote an opinion concurring on the
breach of fiduciary duty analysis and dissenting on the conversion cause of action analysis. See id.
at 150-60, 793 P.2d at 498-506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165-73 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Mosk authored a dissenting opinion. See id. at 160-85, 793 P.2d at 506-23, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
173-90 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 148,793 P.2d at 497,271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The Supreme Court also gave directions
to sustain, with leave to amend, the demurrers of the other defendants regarding the breach of
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent causes of action; sustain, without leave to amend, all
defendants' demurrers to the conversion cause of action; and hear all defendants' remaining
demurrers. Id.
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1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Lack of Informed Consent
In deciding that the defendants had breached a fiduciary duty,
the majority relied on the decision of Cobbs v. Grant"8 for its
analytical foundation.129 The California Supreme Court had
recognized in Cobbs that a competent adult is free to refuse or
submit to medical treatment, and that to be effective, a patient's
consent must be informed. t3 ° Furthermore, the Court noted that
a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information material
to the patient's informed consent decision. 3 '
The Court discussed in some detail the breadth of the informed
consent doctrine, and concluded that this concept was broad enough
to require that a patient be told of his physician's personal research
or economic interests in the case, as a necessary corollary to
informed consent.3 2 In support of this conclusion, the Moore
Court referred to California Business and Professions Code section
654.2,133 which prohibits a physician from charging a patient on
behalf of any organization in which the physician has a significant
beneficial interest unless the patient first receives written disclosure
of that interest.34 Persuasive authority was also found in
California Health and Safety Code section 24173,'
which

128. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
129. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150. See notes 20-40 and
accompanying text (discussing the Cobbs decision).
130. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 128-32, 793 P.2d at 483-85, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150-52. The Court noted that a sick
patient "deserves to be free of any reasonable suspicion that his doctor's judgment is influenced by
a profit motive." Id. at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (citing Magan Medical Clinic v.
Cal. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 249 Cal. App. 2d 124, 132, 57 Cal, Rptr. 256 (1967)).
133. California Business and Professions Code section 654.2(a) states in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person ... to charge, bill or otherwise solicit payment from a
patient on behalf of, or refer a patient to, an organization in which the licensee, or the
licensee's family, has a significant beneficial interest, unless the licensee ust discloses
in writing to the patient, that there is such an interest ....
CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654.2(a) (West 1990).
134. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 129-30, 793 P.2d at 484, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
135. California Health and Safety Code section 24173 states in pertinent part:
As used in this chapter, "informed consent" means the authorization given... to have
a medical experiment performed after each ofthe following conditions have been satisfied:
(c) the subject . . . is informed both verbally and within the written
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mandates that a physician planning to conduct medical experiments
involving a drug or device must inform the patient of the sponsor
or funding source of the experiment.136
The Court was unmoved by Dr. Golde's argument that later
scientific use of excised cells could not affect a patient's medical
interests.137 The Court apparently agreed with this argument in
cases where the physician's interest accrues after he recommends
a medical procedure to a patient. 138 However, the majority was
concerned that a physician with a pre-existing research interest may
not be completely objective in his judgment. 139 While
acknowledging that a patient's judgment may be corrupted to the
detriment of his health by disclosure of research and economic
interests, the Court found the patient's interest in complete and
informed decision-making to be of primary concern."4 Citing
Cobbs, the Court noted that under California law, a physician does
not have unbridled discretion to determine what to disclose.141
Further, the Court stated that "unlimited discretion in the physician
is irreconcilable" with the patient's right to make the ultimate
142
decision regarding medical treatment.
Applying these principles to Dr. Golde's behavior prior to the
splenectomy on October 20, 1976, as well as the doctor's postoperative treatment of Moore, the Court concluded that Moore's

consent form, in nontechnical terms and in a language in the subject . . . is
fluent, of the following facts of the proposed medical experiment which might
influence the decision to undergo the experiment, including, but not limited to:
(9) The name of the sponsor or funding source, if any, or manufacturer
if the experiment involves a drug or device, and the organization, if any, under
whose general aegis the experiment is being conducted.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173(c)(9) (West 1984). See id. § 24173 (informed consent).
136. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 130, 793 P.2d at 484, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 130-32, 793 P.2d at 484-85, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52.
141. Id.
142. Id. 131, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
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informed
allegations stated a cause of action for failure to obtain
1 43
duty.
fiduciary
a
of
consent or, alternatively, breach
2. Conversion
In a subsequent portion of the opinion, the California Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether Moore had properly pleaded
a cause of action for conversion of his blood and bodily
substances.'" Moore argued that he had a continuing property
interest in his cells which gave him the authority to decide what
use would be made of the cells after excision.145 Moore
maintained that the defendants' use of the cells without his consent
constituted the tort of conversion, and that the appropriate remedy
would be to grant Moore a proprietary interest in any products the
defendants might later develop from his cells or the patented cell
46

line.1

The California Supreme Court, however, declined to accept
Moore's conversion theory. 47 First, the majority noted a
complete lack of reported decisions addressing the issue of liability
for conversion of human tissues. 4 The Court further noted that
human cell lines have been used in scientific research since 1951
making it unlikely that the dearth of case law was attributable to

143. Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 486, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153. The Court upheld the superior court
ruling that Moore had not adequately plead breach of fiduciary duty based on Golde's initial
examination on October 5, 1976, since Moore did not allege that Golde intended at that time to
exploit Moore's cells. Id. The Court noted that the splenectomy itself was of therapeutic value in
treating Moore's condition. Id. at 133, n.11, 793 P.2d at 486, n.11, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153, n.11. The
Court did not rule on the liability of the remaining defendants for breach of fiduciary duty since that
issue had not been reached below. Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 486, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153. However, the
Court did indicate that defendants Quan, the Regents, GI and Sandoz had no fiduciary responsibility
to Moore, and that liability could only attach vicariously through the conduct of Golda. Id. at 134,
793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154. The superior court had not addressed the sufficiency of
Moore's allegations that the Regents and Quan acted as Golde's agents. Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 486,
271 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
144. Id. at 133-47, 793 P.2d at 487-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154-164.
145. Id. at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 133-47, 793 P.2d at 487-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154-164 (analyzing Mooro's
conversion cause of action).
148. Id. at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
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"recent developments in technology."' 149 Second, the majority
considered whether a legal duty should be imposed on researchers
to investigate the title and consent attached to every human cell
sample used in research. 5 ' The majority began this aspect of its
conversion analysis by recognizing the myriad social, ethical and
commercial policy concerns intimately intertwined in this case."'
Yet, the Court recognized a jurisprudential principle of reluctance
to find new tort duties in the face of such complicated and
conflicting policy issues.152
The Court next reviewed existing law, finding no basis for a
conversion cause of action.' 53 In the absence of direct authority
supporting the alleged ownership interest in his blood and bodily
substances, Moore analogized his purported rights to those
recognized as privacy-interest rights. 54 Moore cited the publicity
cases of Lugosi v. Universal Pictures'55 and Motschenbacher v.

149. Id. at 135 n.15, 793 P.2d at 487 n.15, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154 n.15.
150. Id. at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154. Imposing conversion liability would
be the practical equivalent of requiring investigation into the title of each cell sample, the pedigree,
since such an investigation would be the sole means of avoiding liability. Id. at 135 n.16, 793 P.2d
at 487 n.16, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154, n. 16. See supra notes 41-88 and accompanying text (discussing
the tort of conversion).
151. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136, 793 P.2d at 488, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
152. Id. at 136, 793 P.2d at 488, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155. In support of the advised judicial
reticence to allow new tort actions, the majority cited Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d
278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988) (refusing to allow a negligence action for 'clergy
malpractice") and Foley v. InteractiveData Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654,765 P.2d 373,254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988) (barring tort remedy for breach of covenant of good faith in employment contract). Moore,
51 Cal. 3d at 136, 793 P.2d at 488, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155. Justice Panelli was also concerned that the
Court should not impose new duties in situations where a legislative determination of duty would be
more appropriate. Id.
153. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136, 793 P.2d at 488, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
154. Id.at 137-38, 793 P.2d at 489,271 Cal. Rptr. at 156. Moore did not claim that he retained
a right to actual possession of the cells. Id. Possession would be inconsistent with California Health
and Safety Code section 7054.4 which requires that "recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues,
anatomical human remains or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed
of by internment, [or] incineration .... ""CAL. HEALTH & SAFEry CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp.
1991).
155. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (in suit brought by widow of
movie actor Bela Lugosi seeking to enjoin licensing of Count Dracula character, held that right to
exploit likeness and name is personal to artist and must be exercised by artist during lifetime).
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RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company56 for the proposition that a
person has a protected proprietary interest in his own likeness.'
The Lugosi and Motschenbacher cases established that a tort
remedy is available for the unauthorized commercial use of a
person's likeness.'58 However, the remedy provided for in Lugosi
and Motschenbacher was not based on property law principles. 59
Moore urged the Court to expand this recognized proprietary
interest in one's persona to one's genetic material. 10 Genetic
material, Moore argued, is "far more profoundly the essence of
one's human uniqueness"61 than the persona protected in the
wrongful publicity cases.'
The majority was unpersuaded by this argument, given the
scope of defendants' previously issued patent. 162 That patent
enabled its owners to manufacture lympholdnes,' 6s which are
produced using genetic material that is the same in all human
beings, unlike one's persona.'14 The majority was similarly
unmoved by Moore's analogy to cases recognizing the right of
patients to reject medical treatment.'65 The patient's rights are

156. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (in suit by professional racing car driver against cigarette
manufacturer for alleged misappropriation of driver's likeness in television advertisements, court held
that California courts would protect individual's proprietary interest in individual's own identity).
157. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 137-38, 793 P.2d at 489-90, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57.
158. Id. at 138, 793 P.2d at 490, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Lymphoklnes are soluble substances released by sensitized lymphocytes (white blood cells)
on contact with a specific antigen, which helps cellular immunity. STEDMAN'S MEIicAL DiCnoNAtY,
supra note 104, at 817. The usefulness of a cell line is its characteristic of continuous multiplication
and division, i.e. an ability to continually reproduce itself. Eltnan, Physician's Self-Disclosure
Emerges as a Key Issue from the Moore Case, Genetic Engineering News, Sept. 1990, at 3. In this
case, the cell line enabled study of, among other things, T-lymphocytes infected with HTLV-II. Id.
164. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 138-39, 793 P.2d at 490, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
165. Id. at 139-40,793 P.2d at 491,271 Cal. Rptr. at 158. Moore relied on a 1986 case, Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127,225 Cal. Rptr. 297, for the rule that -[e]very human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body ...."
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 139-40,793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158. The Court of Appeal used this
language to buttress its decision that a patient had the power to direct the use of his cells. Id. Cf
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (recognizing that a
competent patient has a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment and holding that the
U.S. Constitution does not prevent a state from requiring clear and convincing evidence of
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more effectively safeguarded, the Court held, by compelling full
disclosure of the physician's research interests than by allowing a
conversion cause of action."
The majority next considered the effect of California statutory
law on Moore's claim of conversion.167 The main focus of
California's statutory scheme is to ensure the safe, sanitary disposal
of human remains and infectious waste."' California Health and
Safety Code section 7054.4 mandates internment or incineration of
human tissues and infectious waste after scientific use of these
items is completed.16 9 The language of this section does not
indicate legislative intent regarding compensation of a patient for
unauthorized use of his cells.' However, since the statute was
designed to severely restrict a patient's control over removed cells,
the majority concluded that the statute erased virtually all of the
property rights attached to the cells, with the effect that conversion
was no longer meaningful. 171 The Court was of the opinion that
enough of a property interest remained to allow a fully-informed
patient to refuse consent to a scientific use of the cells that the
patient did not support. 172 Again, the Court concluded that the
would be
ability to withhold consent under those circumstances
173
protected by requiring full disclosure to the patient.
Additionally, the majority was unwilling to expand conversion
liability in this instance, because the patented cell line and
derivative products were both factually and legally separate from
the cells removed from Moore's body. 74 Federal patent law

incompetent patient's desire to terminate life support); In re Quinlan, 7q NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976) (decision of patient to terminate life support in event of persistent vegetative state was part
of patient's right of privacy which could be asserted on her behalf by her guardian).
166. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
167. Id. See supranotes 90-103 and accompanying text (discussing relevant California statutory
law).
168. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
169. Id. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1991) (disposal of human
remains after scientific use).
170. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
171. Id. at 140-41, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
172. Id. at 141, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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provides for the patenting of organisms developed through "human
ingenuity.""17 Naturally occurring, non-modified living organisms
may not be patented.176 The patent issued to the Regents provided
authority for the majority to declare that the Mo cell line was
the
17
product of Golde's research, and not of Moore's own body.
The majority next examined two policy considerations
implicated by expanding conversion liability in the context of
Moore's allegations. 17 The first is a patient's right to make
independent decisions about medical treatment. 179 This right must
be safeguarded with effective remedies against physicians who fail
to disclose relevant information and who fail to obtain properly
informed consent.' 0 Balanced against this right is the second
policy consideration of limiting the potential liability that may
attach to socially useful activities such as biotechnology
research.'" In weighing these policy considerations, the majority
placed great emphasis on the latter, and on the possibility that
medical research would be impeded by expanding conversion

175. Id. Title 35 U.S.C. § 101 mandates that "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof' may be granted
patent protection. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1984). An unaltered product of nature is not patentable
because it does not belong to any of the classes in section 101. D. CHIsuM, PATENTS, vol. 1 §§ 1.011.02[7] (1988). However, a genetically-altered microorganism may be patentable as either a
manufacture or composition of matter. Id. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
(holding that a modified microorganism could receive patent protection as either a manufacture or
composition of matter); Cf. M. Sitzman, Copyright: An Alternative Within the Field of
Biotechnology? (1990) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal) (suggesting
that genetically engineered works are a proper subject for copyright protection).
176. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 141-42, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
177. Id. at 141-42, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
178. Id. at 142-47, 793 P.2d at 493-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-64.
179. Id. at 143, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
180. Id. The patient's right to full disclosure and informed consent is examined in Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). See supra notes 20-40 and
accompanying text (discussing the Cobbs case).
181. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
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liability.182 Since conversion is a strict liability tort, 183 an
aggrieved patient in a Moore-type action would be able to recover
from any party that used the patient's cells, even if that party acted
in good faith and was unaware that the patient had not consented

to use of his cells."8 4
The majority concluded that scientific exchange and progress

would be stifled if researchers were required to ascertain the title
of each cell sample prior to use.'85 Unwilling to take any action
which could have an adverse impact on medical research, and
persuaded that the fiduciary duty and full disclosure obligations
would effectively protect patients, the majority declined to extend
conversion liability to cases86involving unauthorized commercial
exploitation of human cells.'
C. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk challenged the majority's

analysis of Moore's conversion cause of action."8 7 Justice Mosk
responded to the majority's emphasis on the lack of precedent

182. Id. at 144-45, 793 P.2d at 494-95, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62. The majority gleaned much
of the supporting data for this thesis from a report issued by the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA). See OTA Report, supra note 1. The majority also referred to another California Supreme
Court case, Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988),
wherein the Court had determined that if drug manufacturers were subject to strict liability, they
would be less likely to undertake new pharmaceutical research for fear of incurring large damages
awards. See infra note 226 (discussing Justice Mosk's dissent on the analogy to Brown).
183. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing strict liability aspect of
conversion).
184. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
185. Id. at 144-45, 793 P.2d at 494-95, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62. Currently, human cell lines
are exchanged by researchers and scientists on a large scale. Id.Tissue banks and tissue repositories
are engaged for storing and disseminating cell samples. Id. These repositories process tens of
thousands of requests annually; samples are often distributed at no cost in order to further scientific
research and interchange. Id.
186. Id. at 145-47, 793 P.2d at 495-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 162-64. See generally Bohrer, Old
Blood In New Bottles, 9 BIOTECH. L RE'. 251, 252-53 (1990) (arguing that the Moore decision
confuses the issue of the relief sought by Moore with the issue of whether Moore properly pleaded
a conversion cause of action).
187. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 160-61,793 P.2d at 506,271 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that a physician must disclose to the patient any personal
interest the physician has in the patient's treatment. Id. at 178,793 P.2d at 519,271 Cal. Rptr. at 186
(Mosk, J., dissenting).

291

Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 23
cases establishing an ownership interest in excised human cells by
noting that Moore is a case of first impression. 8' Equally
unsatisfying, according to Justice Mosk, was the majority's
contention that the Legislature should determine the issue.8 9
Justice Mosk stated that courts are often the primary instruments
for adapting the common law to advances in science and
technology.1 90
Moreover, Justice Mosk was not persuaded by
the majority's interpretation of California statutory law as
restricting a patient's control over his excised cells, thereby
eliminating any property interest in those cells. 19 1 The plain
language of California Health and Safety Code section 7054.4
refers to "scientific use" of body tissues before destruction."w
The statute does not specifically mention the commercial
exploitation of cells. It would reach beyond the ordinary
interpretation of the statute, Justice Mosk argued, to find that the
term "scientific use" contemplated the type of commercial
exploitation Moore alleged."
Further, Justice Mosk indicated that it did not follow that by
simply limiting the use which could be made of excised cells, the
statute removed all property rights. 94 Rather, the concept of
property is expansive enough to include every type of right and

188. Id. at 160-62, 793 P.2d at 506-07, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
189. Id. at 162-63, 793 P.2d at 507-08, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
190. Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 294 (1980) (adopting theory of market share liability imposed on defendant
pharmaceutical manufacturers for injuries resulting from prescription drug).
191. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 163-66, 793 P.2d at 508-10, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 175-77 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Cf supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis of
California statutory scheme).
192. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 164, 793 P.2d at 508, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Mosk agreed that the term "scientific use' would include routine postoperative examination
of excised tissue. Id. The term might also refer to purely scientific, as opposed to commercial, studies
of tissue done with the consent of the patient. Id.
193. Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). The interpretation of California Health & Safety Code §7054.4
advocated by the dissent would distinguish between a truly scientific use of human cells, which might
produce a valuable by-product, and a purposeful commercial development of a cell-derived product.
Id. at 164-65, 793 P.2d at 508-09, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
194. Id. (Mosk, 3., dissenting). See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text (discussing
majority opinion that section 7054.4 functioned to eliminate property rights).
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interest capable of possession and transfer. 95 Analogizing to
zoning and nuisance laws, Justice Mosk noted that property rights
of owners are often restricted by statute, but are not thereby
considered extinguished.'" A protectable property interest
remains even if the property owner's choices are limited by
law."9 Therefore, even assuming section 7054.4 circumscribed
Moore's rights to his excised tissues, Justice Mosk proffered that
some property interests must survive.'9 8 Justice Mosk envisioned
that Moore retained the right to arrange for the commercial
development of his own cells, at least to the extent afforded the
defendant. 199
Further, Justice Mosk rejected the majority's contention that
Moore could not maintain a conversion action because the Mo cell
line and its products were distinguishable from Moore's own
cells."° The purpose of developing a cell line is to extend the life
of the parent cells indefinitely.2 ' Moore's cells were valuable to
the defendants because they produced an abundance of specific
proteins.2" It is the commercial exploitation of that protein
producing capacity that was at issue in this case.2 ' 3
Additionally, Justice Mosk concluded that the defendants'
patent on the Mo cell line could not be used to defeat Moore's
claim of conversion.2 The majority neglected the fact that the
patent was not granted until seven years after the cells were
removed from Moore's body.2 5 Assuming, arguendo, that the

195.

Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 165, 793 P.2d at 509, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (Mosk, J., dissenting)

Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 523, 279 P. 128, 129 (1929)).
(citing Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irr.
dissenting).
196. Id. at 165-66, 793 P.2d at 509-10, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77 (Mosk, J.,
197. Id. at 166, 793 P.2d at 510,271 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Mosk, ., dissenting). Since property
or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the pruning away of some or
even many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title. Id. (citing People v. Walker, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 18, 20, 90 P.2d 854, 858 (1939)).
198. Id. (Mosk, L, dissenting).

dissenting). The Court of Appeal noted that "[d]efendants' position that
199. Id. (Mosk, J.,
plaintiff cannot own his tissue, but that they can, is fraught with irony." Id.
200. Id. at 167-69, 793 P.2d at 510-12, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79 (Mosk, L, dissenting).
201. Id. at 167, 793 P.2d at 511, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Mosk, L, dissenting).

202. Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
203.
204.
205.

Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 167-69, 793 P.2d at 511-12, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79 (Mosk, L, dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 167-68, 793 P.2d at 511, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Mosk, J.,
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patent did terminate Moore's rights, the patent could not
retroactively insulate the defendants for their unauthorized use of
Moore's cells before the patent issued.2" Moreover, it is not clear
that approval of the patent would completely eradicate Moore's
interests. 7 Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that the Mo
cell line was principally a product of defendants' ingenuity, but
countered that the cell line would have been impossible without
Moore's cells.2"' Since Moore's contribution to the project was
vital, the patent should not be used to terminate all of Moore's
29
rights. 0
Justice Mosk advocated the adoption of the "joint inventor"
solution and argued that the policy reasons supporting joint
inventor patents should apply with equal force to cell donors.21 0
Justice Mosk concluded that any person who contributes in a
substantial way to the development of a product should be allowed
to share in the resulting commercial rewards.21 ' Under this
theory, the Regents' patent would not prevent Moore from being
compensated for the use of his cells because he would be a
contributor of record.212
Justice Mosk next turned to the policy reasons propounded by
the majority for barring a conversion cause of action. 213 Justice
Mosk noted that the majority's first consideration, the protection of
patients' autonomous decisions, would be furthered by allowing a
conversion action, since the threat of conversion liability would
214
encourage the physician to fully disclose any personal interests.
206. Id. at 168, 793 P.2d at 511, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
207. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
209. Id. at 169, 793 P.2d at 512, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
210. Id. The OTA Report, however, determined that cell donors should not be considered
inventors. OTA Report, supra note 1. Cell donors apparently do not qualify as "joint inventors" as
that term is defined in federal law. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 169,793 P.2d at 512,271 Cal. Rptr. at 179

(Mosk, J.,
dissenting). See 35 U.S.C .A§ 116 (West Supp. 1991) (requirements for joint inventor
patents).
211. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 169, 793 P.2d at 512, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
212. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 169-73, 793 P.2d at 512-15, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 179-82 (Mosk, I., dissenting).
214. Id. at 169-70, 793 P.2d at 512-13, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). The
majority conceded that potential conversion liability would indirectly protect patient decision making.
Id. Ft 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
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controlling by the majority, the protection of innocent parties from
excessive liability." 5 Justice Mosk did not agree that the threat
of conversion liability would adversely impact free and efficient
scientific exchange.216
The reality of biotechnology research is that scientific exchange
is not as free as it was prior to the 1980 United States Supreme
2, 7 which held that
Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
biological products of genetic engineering are patentable." 8
While the majority viewed the Chakrabartydecision as facilitating
developments within the field of biotechnology, Justice Mosk
observed a downside to the patentability of genetically engineered
biological products.2" 9 The desire for patent protection has
compelled researchers to restrict access to their products, keeping
valuable scientific information secret in order to meet the
"novelty" requirement of patentability.220 In point of fact, the
defendants in Moore had attested in their patent application that the
use of the Mo cell line and its products was strictly controlled."
To Justice Mosk, the notion of free scientific exchange of
information and materials no longer exists.' In addition, the
involvement of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in
academic research has contributed to greater restrictions on the use

215. Id. at 170-73,793 P.2d at 513-15, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 18-82 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk considered the majority's emphasis on -innocent parties" to be misplaced. Id. at 170, n.14,
793 P.2d at 513, n.14, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 180, n.14 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The complaint cited
numerous examples of duplicitous behavior by the defendants which were inconsistent with the
characterization of innocence accepted by the majority. Id.
216. Id. at 170-71, 793 P.2d at 513, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
217. 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding thata live, genetically altered microorganism was patentable
as either a "manufacture or composition of matter" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101).
218. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 170-71,793 P.2d at513,271 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Mosk, L, dissenting).
220. Id. at 171, 793 P.2d at 513, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk stated:
At no time has the Mo cell line been available to other than the investigators involved with its
initial discovery and only the conditioned medium from the cell line has been made available
to a limited number of investigators for collaborative work with the original discoverer of the
Mo cell line.
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) See U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984) (Mo cell line patent).
222. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 171,793 P.2d at 513, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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of genetic products, and to the frequent use of trade secret
protection for genetic discoveries. 3 The possibility of a
conversion cause of action is unlikely to add to the barriers to free
exchange which already exist. 4 Furthermore, even where cells
and tissues can be freely exchanged, the source of those cells could
be easily identified through appropriate record keeping.22 Since
these records would reflect the donor's consent and the restrictions,
if any, on6 use of the donated cells, conversion liability could be
avoided.22
Additionally, Justice Mosk proffered several policy
considerations other than those listed by the majority.2 27 Of great
importance to Justice Mosk was the "profound ethical imperative
to respect the human body as the physical and temporal expression
22
of a unique human persona" that is ingrained in our society.
That social ethic is evidenced by our society's refusal to permit the
abuse of one person for the benefit of another.229 The most
extreme form of such abuse is slavery.23' Allowing researchers

223. Id. at 171-72,793 P.2d at 514,271 Cal. Rptr. at 181 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Note,
Patentand Trade Secret Protectionin University-IndustryResearch Relationships in Biotechnology,
24 HARV. J. ON LEois. 191, 218-19 (1987)).
224. Id. (Mosk, 3., dissenting).
225. Moore, at 172,793 P.2d at 514,271 Cal. Rptr. at 181 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Researchers
already maintain detailed records of tissue sources for other purposes. Id. Therefore, requiring
annotations as to the state of title of the donor cells would not be unduly burdensome. Id. See Note,
Toward the Right ofCommerciality:RecognizingPropertyRights in the Commercial Value of Human
Tssue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1986).
226. Moore, at 172,793 P.2d at 514,271 Cal. Rptr. at 181 (Mosk, 3., dissenting). Justice Mosk
was unpersuaded by the analogy to Brown v. SuperiorCourt, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245
Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988), employed by the majority to illustrate the perils of imposing strict liability on
biotechnology researchers. In an opinion authored by Justice Mosk, the Court in Brown declined to
impose strict liability on manufacturers of "defectively designed" prescription drugs, in part because

of the potentially detrimental effect large damage awards would have on pharmaceutical research.
Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1056, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr at 421. Brown is not good precedent,
according to Justice Mosk, because the harm at issue in that case could not have been avoided by
better record keeping, and the harm was physical, not financial. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 172-73, 793
P.2d at 514-15, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Unlike Moore, Brown was a class
action; the damages in a Moore-type action would be confined to one plaintiff. Id.
227. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 173-76, 793 P.2d at 515-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 182-84 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
228. Id. at 173, 793 P.2d at 515, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Mosk, ., dissenting).
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to profit from cells harvested from an unconsenting patient violates
to benefit from the
that social ethic by permitting researchers 231
body.
patient's
a
of
exploitation
commercial
As a second consideration, Justice Mosk observed the great
value that our society places on principles of equity which prohibit
the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another. 2
Our courts have consistently recognized a policy of fundamental
fairness.233 This policy, Justice Mosk concluded, cannot sanction
gain to one person at the price of harm to another.2 34 According
to Justice Mosk, a conversion cause235 of action would provide a
remedy for violations of this policy.
Justice Mosk also disagreed with the majority's interpretation
of the relevant statutory law.236 Moreover, he interpreted
California statutes as permitting the sale of blood and bodily
tissues." Justice Mosk read the UAGA, which prohibits postmortem transfers of bodies for valuable consideration, to apply only
to sales for "transplantation and therapy." ' 8 According to
Justice Mosk, transfers of body parts for "medical or dental
education, [or] research..." are permitted under the UAGA, as
codified in California Health and Safety Code section
7153(a)(1).239 Concluding that there is no express language
barring sales of body parts for these purposes, Justice Mosk stated
that such sales would be justified under the language of the
statute.24' The UAGA, therefore, seems to recognize that blood
and body parts are a species of transferable property, supportive of
Moore's claim to a compensable property interest in his own
cells.24 ' Justice Mosk concluded that allowing a cause of action

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 174, 793 P.2d at 516, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 183 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
Id. (Mosk, J.,
Id. at 176-78, 793 P.2d at 517-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85 (Mosk, ., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 176, 793 P.2d at 517, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 184 (Mosk, J.,
Id. at 176-77, 793 P.2d at 517-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86 (Mosk, ., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 177, 793 P.2d at 518, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (Mosk, J.,
Id. (Mosk, L., dissenting).
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for conversion of human cells was the more effective way to
protect the interests of plaintiffs such as Moore.242
D. Justice Arabian'sConcurring Opinion
Justice Arabian authored a brief concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the majority's analysis of the Moore case.243 Justice
Arabian wrote separately to give emphasis to the moral issue which
he found evident, albeit unmentioned, in the majority's
reasoning. 2'
The gravamen of Moore's complaint, according to Justice
Arabian, is that Moore was requesting the Court to sanction the
selling of one's own body for profit.245 The effect of such a
judicial sanction would be to equate the human body, a most
special and unique instrument, with the most mundane commercial
product.246 Justice Arabian was convinced that the Court is not
the appropriate forum to make a determination of such
magnitude.247 Instead, Justice Arabian commented that the greater
judicial wisdom is shown in refusing to make decisions where
issues as morally profound and complex as property rights in the
human body are involved.24 The repercussions to human dignity,
research, and the commercial marketplace which would flow from
judicial recognition of a property right in the human body could
not be anticipated by the Court.249 Thus, a ruling of such gravity
clearly belongs to the Legislature. 25
Justice Arabian also addressed Justice Mosk's dissenting
argument that morality and policy concerns favor granting Moore

242. Id. at 185, 793 P.2d at 523, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
243. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 148-50, 793 P.2d at 497-98, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65 (Arabian, .,
concurring).
244. Id. at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. (Arabian, ., concurring).
245. Id. (Arabian, I., concurring).
246. Id. (Arabian, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, J., concurring).
248. Id. (Arabian, 3., concurring).
249. Id. (Arabian, ., concurring).
250. Id. (Arabian, ., concurring).
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a conversion cause of action." 1 Justice Arabian shared Justice
Mosk's view that morality issues factored strongly in the case, but
disagreed that the uncertainty should be resolved in favor of
Moore. 2 Rather, Justice Arabian suggested that Justice Mosk's
resolution of the morality issues might function to denigrate,
instead of protect, human dignity. 5 Since the Court could not
possibly predict which outcome
would occur, the decision should
4
be left to the Legislature.25
E. Justice Broussard'sConcurringand Dissenting Opinion
Justice Broussard began his opinion by noting his agreement
with the majority on the issues of breach of fiduciary duty and lack
of informed consent. 5 Justice Broussard found the majority's
analysis of these causes of action persuasive. 6
Justice Broussard proceeded by taking notice of the unusual
fact pattern involved in the Moore case. 7 Unlike the typical
case, where a patient consents to the use of his cells and their
commercial value is discovered much later, Moore's complaint
alleges that the value of his cells was known to Dr. Golde prior to
excision." 8 According to Justice Broussard, the majority used the
fact of the doctor's prior knowledge in determining that Moore
could maintain a cause of action for lack of disclosure.29

251. Id. at 148-49,793 P.2d at 497-98,271 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65 (Arabian, L, concurring). See
supra notes 213-235 and accompanying text (discussing the policy arguments in Justice Mosk's
dissenting opinion).
252. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 793 P.2d at 497-98, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65 (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
253. Id. at 149, 793 P.2d at 497-98, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65 (Arabian, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 149-50, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 151, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting). See supra notes 128-143 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion on
issues of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent).
256. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
257. Id. at 150-51,793 P.2d at 498-99, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66 (Broussard, L, concurring and
dissenting).
258. Id. at 150, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, I., concurring and
dissenting).
259. Id. at 151, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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However, Justice Broussard stated that the majority seemingly
forgot about the prior knowledge factor in ruling on the conversion
cause of action.2 " Focusing on the possible detrimental effect a
conversion cause of action would have on biotechnology research,
the majority concluded that there was no property right in excised
human cells or body parts.26' Justice Broussard argued that this
focus was misplaced, because the real issue in Moore's complaint
was the allegation that the defendants interfered with Moore's legal
rights in his cells before they were excised.262
Justice Broussard agreed with the majority that conversion
would not be appropriate in the ordinary case, where the
commercial value of the cells or body parts is unknown to the
physician and patient until long after consent has been given.6 3
In that situation, the patient has abandoned whatever interest he
may have had in the cells prior to their removal. 2 Conversion
has occurred, however, when a defendant has wrongfully interfered
with a plaintiff's right to determine how the plaintiff's currently
intact body parts will be used after their excision.2
Justice Broussard argued that the majority ruling was not based
on the broad principle that property rights do not attach to excised
human tissue.2 Such a proposition is not logical; if the excised
cells had been stolen from a laboratory, no court would conclude
that conversion would not lie against the thief.267 Justice
Broussard concluded that the majority holding must be read to
mean that the patient retains no property interest in his cells after

260. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
261. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
262. Id. (Broussard, , concurring and dissenting).
263. Id. at 153, 793 P.2d at 500, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (Broussard, J., concurring
dissenting).
264. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
265. Id. at 153, 793 P.2d at 500-01, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68 (Broussard, J., concurring
dissenting).
266. Id. at 153, 793 P.2d at 501, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (Broussard, J., concurring
dissenting).
267. Id. at 154, 793 P.2d at 501, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (Broussard, J., concurring

issenting).
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they have been removed from his body.2' Justice Broussard
criticized the majority for not addressing the real issue in the case:
whether the patient has the right to decide how a removed body
part will be used before excision occurs.2"
Referring to language in the UAGA that expressly authorizes
the making of anatomical gifts for any of the purposes specified in
the statute, Justice Broussard determined that California law does
grant the patient the right to decide how donated body parts are to
be used.270 Although the UAGA applies only to post-mortem
transfers of body parts, Justice Broussard found the statute
indicative of the state's general policy regarding the control and
use of excised body parts.27 ' Justice Broussard argued that
because the Act permits the donor to specify the recipient or use
of the donated part, within statutory limits, it grants the donor the
ultimate authority to determine what will be done with the donated
material.27 Justice Broussard concluded California law gives the
patient the right, prior to excision, to control the post-removal use
of his bodily material.273 Furthermore, interference with the right
to control the use of one's property is compensable under the tort
of conversion.274
Justice Broussard also disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of Health and Safety Code section 7054.4 which
governs the disposal of body parts after scientific use.2' While
the majority correctly concluded that the statute restricts the
patient's control over an excised body part, the statute in no way

268. Id. at 153-54, 793 P.2d at 501, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
269. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
270. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). See supra note 93 and accompanying text
(discussing UAGA).
271. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
272. Id. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing the UAGA as adopted in

California).
273. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 157, 793 P.2d at 503, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
274. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying

text (discussing the tort of conversion).
275. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 156, 793 P.2d at 503, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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suggests that the patient is not permitted276to choose among the
legally allowable uses of the excised part.
Justice Broussard next addressed the majority's analysis of the
effect of federal patent law on Moore's claim. 277 Assuming that
the majority had accurately interpreted the applicable patent law,
there was no reason to believe that patent law would deny Moore
a conversion action for the unauthorized use of his cells.27
According to Justice Broussard, the patent law defense would be
relevant only to damages, thus preventing Moore from recovering
all of the value of the patent and its derivative products. 279 The
amount of damages, however, is not pertinent to the question of
whether a conversion action can be maintained." °
Finally, Justice Broussard attacked the policy arguments
proffered by the majority for rejecting a conversion cause of
action." 1 The majority's concern that free access to research
materials will be impeded by the threat of conversion liability does
not justify the refusal to allow conversion to attach where the
defendants did not obtain cells from a cell repository, but rather
obtained the cells directly from the plaintiff.2 2 Justice Broussard
noted that the majority's fear that access to cellular materials would
be adversely affected was unfounded since the fact situations in
which conversion liability would be appropriate would be very
few. 3 Conversion liability would only attach where the
physician knowingly misinformed the patient as to the value of the
cells or where the patient's specific requests regarding the use of
the cells were not followed.' Justice Broussard also noted that

276.
277.

Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 157, 793 P.2d at 503, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (Broussard, J., concurring and

dissenting).
278. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
279. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
280. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
281. Id. at 157-60,793 P.2d at 504-06,271 Cal. Rptr. at 171-73 (Broussard, ., concurring and
dissenting).
282. Id. at 157-58, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
283. Id. at 158-59, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
284. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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if the true value of the patent and derivative products results from
the efforts of the researchers, and not the contribution of the
patient, the 5 damages of the patient would be limited
accordingly.2
Justice Broussard stated that the greatest flaw in the majority's
policy argument was that it effectively sanctioned the intentional
misappropriation of commercial value from the patient by allowing
this exception to conversion liability. 6 Although the majority
had focused on the patient's right of autonomous decision-making,
Justice Broussard argued that the patient's right to the commercial
value of his own body parts was equally important. 7 Justice
Broussard concluded that, based on the allegations in the
complaint, Moore had adequately pleaded a conversion cause of
action.288
I. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

Read broadly, the decision of the California Supreme Court in
Moore v. Regents of the University of California stands for the
proposition that there is no convertible property interest in human
tissue. Concurrently, the decision considerably widens the scope of
the doctrine of informed consent by imposing on the physician a
fiduciary duty to disclose any personal interest he may have in the
case unrelated to the patient's treatment.
Read more narrowly, the Moore decision indicates only that
extension of conversion liability was unnecessary based on the
facts of the case because the plaintiff's rights would be adequately
protected by imposing a duty of full disclosure on the physician.
Since a number of unanswered questions remain following the
decision of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the
implications this decision will have on future cases dealing with the

285. Id. at 159, 793 P.2d at 505, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Broussard, ., concurring and
dissenting).
286. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
287. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
288. Id. at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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issues of informed consent and the nature of an individual's rights
in the individual's own tissue remain unclear. It is the purpose of
this Note to examine some of the implications of the Moore
decision, and to propose some solutions to the questions that
remain.
A. What "Interests" Must Be Disclosed After Moore?
What is the nature of an "interest" which must be disclosed by
a physician to avoid liability for breach of fiduciary duty or lack
of valid informed consent following Moore? There are no
definitions or guidelines given in the opinion beyond the general
mandate that any personal interests that may affect the physician's
professional judgment must be disclosed to the patient.289
Recall that in Cobbs v. Grant, the California Supreme Court
determined that any information material to the patient's decisionmaking process must be disclosed. 2' Using this standard, it
would appear that the physician should inform the patient of any
personal interest of the physician which would have an affect on
the patient's decision. In other words, it seems that any personal
interest of the physician, which the patient believes would affect
the physician's judgment, would require disclosure.
It seems logical, based on the facts in Moore, that a physician
must disclose any substantial financial interest he may have in his
patient's treatment or bodily materials.2 9 It is unclear, however,
if less direct interests would necessitate disclosure. For instance,
must the patient be informed that the physician owns publiclytraded stock in a pharmaceutical company which will own the
patent on the products, if any, developed through research in which
the patient's cells are used? Certainly the Moore rule would
support the argument that a physician must disclose the ovnership
of such stock. Yet, if the physician holds only a few shares, or is

289. Id. at 130, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
290. See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Cobbs case).
291. See Annas, Blinded by Science, 9 BIoTncH. L REP. 245,249-50 (1990) (noting that the
Moore holding suggests that physicians should disclose their profit on the proposed treatment, their
annual income, and other personal financial information).
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not an active stockholder, it seems unlikely that mere ownership
would influence that physician's judgment or that patient's
decision-making. Since the Moore holding did not include a
concrete test for determining in advance which personal interests
a particular physician must disclose, the decision may subject the
courts to a case-by-case factual determination of whether a
particular plaintiff may bring an action for breach of the Moore
duty.
B. The Effect of Greater Disclosure on the Doctor-Patient
Relationship
Consider also the effect of mandatory disclosure on the doctorpatient relationship. Certainly there is a persuasive argument that
detailed and complete disclosure improves this relationship by
opening communication and reassuring the patient that the
physician is being completely candid. However, it must also be
noted that permitting the physician to speculate about the potential
uses and value of the patient's excised cells may place the
physician in the inappropriate role of financial advisor to the
patient.2" If the physician is not directly involved in the research,
the physician may be unable or unwilling to explain and comment
on matters outside of the physician's area of expertise. In such a
situation, it seems likely that there would be a possibility of
confusing or misleading the patient and clouding the patient's
ability to make an informed decision.
There is a chance that disclosing research interests may obscure
the patient's treatment decisions by shifting the patient's focus
from the patient's immediate health needs to the collateral issues
of research and development. The deleterious effects on the
292. It seems likely that the patient's first request for additional information on potential
financial rewards and probabilities of success would be directed to the physician. See Moore, 51 Cal.
3d at 152 n.10, 793 P.2d at 485 n.10, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152 n.10 (noting that the term "'fiduciary"
does not mean that a physician has a duty to protect the patient's financial interests). Cf. Thomburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986) (state could not
compel physicians to inform women seeking abortions of the biological father's financial
responsibility or of the medical assistance benefits available since this information was confusing,
misleading and not relevant to informed consent).
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patient's health and treatment choices are clear. Since requiring
patient consent to use of the excised tissues implies that the patient
may withhold consent,293 it is easy to imagine a patient enticed
to "shop" for the most financially advantageous treatment
arrangement. For a patient requiring immediate or specialized care,
the delay could result in the worsening of the patient's condition,
or even death.
Of course, not all patients would be motivated to withhold
consent for economic gain. Some patients may have religious or
moral reasons for refusing to allow their cells to be utilized in
certain types of research, believing that genetic manipulation is the
province of the deity. 294 Still other patients may deny research
access to their cells because of a political disagreement with the
purpose of the research.295 May the physician terminate treatment
if the patient, for whatever reason, is unwilling to consent to the
research? If the incentive for each is high, it is not difficult to
imagine the physician and patient engaged in the bartering of
treatment and consent.296
The Moore decision correctly recognizes that the patient's
individual autonomy to determine what use is made of the patient's
cells deserves judicial protection. However, there are compelling
policy arguments indicating that nondisclosure will facilitate vital
biotechnology research which is necessary to society.

293. Justice Mosk argued in his dissent that one shortcoming of the sole nondisclosure remedy
is that it allows a patient to refuse consent to the use of his clils, but it does not give him the right
to consent to the use in exchange for compensation. In effect then, the lack of informed consent
action gives the patient veto power only without an affirmative right to participate in commercial
research through contribution of cells or body parts. In contrast, by recognizing that a patient does
retain a property interest in excised cells, a conversion cause of action would protect the patient as
an active and vital participant in research efforts. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 180-81, 793 P.2d at 520, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Mosk, L, dissenting).
294. Cf. Cohen, supra note 94 at 8-11 (discussing religious views on organ transplantation).
295. For instance, consider a hypothetical patient whose cells contain extremely rare and unique
properties of great utility to researchers. If access to that patient's cells could allow researchers to
develop a cure for AIDS, and the patient declines consent, should the patient's decision be binding?
296. This argument assumes that the patient can bargain for compensation in exchange for
consent, effectively "selling' tissue even though there is no property interest. One author has
proposed that a legislative prohibition on selling human tissue for research purposes would solve this
problem. See Note, supra note 73, at 1394.
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C. Difficulty in Proving Causation
Justice Mosk's dissent expressed concern that, in general, an
action for breach of fiduciary duty will be difficult for plaintiffs to
maintain.2 9 7 This difficulty derives from the nature of a breach of

fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent action.298 An action
based on failure to disclose information sounds in negligence, and
requires the plaintiff to prove causation: the plaintiff must show
that he would not have consented to the treatment had he been
aware of the physician's research interest and further, that no
reasonably prudent patient in the same circumstances would have
consented. 9 Stated simply, the plaintiff must demonstrate a
causal link between the physician's lack of disclosure and the
injury sustained by the plaintiff. 00
The objective test of causation, which was required in Cobbs
v. Grant, is the one most frequently employed by courts." 1 The
value of the objective test was thoroughly discussed by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals in a case referred to by the Cobbs court,
Canterbury v. Spence.3" The Canterbury court determined that
tying the factual conclusion on causation to an assessment of the
patient's credibility was not satisfactory because of the danger that
the patient's testimony would be influenced by hindsight and
bitterness. 3 A subjective test, according to Canterbury, would

297. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 179, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
299. Id. See Shult, From Informed Consentto PatientChoice:A New ProtectedInterest, 95
YALE L. 219, 227 (1985) (discussing the objective standard of causation for informed consent
cases). See also supra notes 17-40 and accompanying text (discussing informed consent cause of

action).
300. Morgenroth v. Pacific Medical Center, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521,533, 126 Cal. Rptr. 681,
689 (1976) (holding, inter alia, that failure to give patient information material to informed consent
does not constitute medical malpractice absent proof of causation). See also Stone v. Foster, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 334, 351, 164 Cal. Rptr. 901, 911 (1980) (plaintiff's recovery in a medical malpractice
action founded on failure to warn of risks requires causal relationship between lack of warning and

injury).
301. See Studer, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: ProtectingThe Patient'sRight To Make
InformedHealth Care Decisions,48 MoNT. L REv. 85,99 (1987). See supra notes 36-40 (discussing
the objective test in Cobbs).
302. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064.
303. Id. at 790-91.
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require the fact finder to evaluate whether a patient's speculative
answer to a hypothetical question should be credited.3 For these
reasons, the objective test of causality is preferable.0 5
However, the objective test is not exclusive. At least one court
has discarded the Canterbury objective test on the basis that the
test restricts the very right to self-determination that the original
cause of action was designed to protect.3 That is, to the extent
the plaintiff, with full knowledge, would have refused the proposed
treatment and a reasonable person similarly situated would have
accepted it, the patient's right of self-determination is irrevocably
lost.3 7 Finally, a compromise test of causation was adopted in
Leyson v. Steuermann °8 in which the Hawaiian court analyzed
causation on the basis of the actual patient acting reasonably.3 °9
As previously noted, the objective causality test of Cobbs
remains the standard in California. There is no indication that the
Moore Court contemplated the use of any other test. However, the
objective test does present a serious problem of proof to a Mooretype plaintiff whose injury will be difficult for a jury to assess.
Given the nebulosity of an injury to the right of self-decision, how
will the patient be able to prove that a reasonable person would not
have consented to the post-operative use of his cells? Even if the
injury is defined as loss of commercial value, rather than a
violation of self-autonomy, it will be difficult for the jury to assign
an economic value to it.
Justice Mosk thought it unlikely that most juries would believe
that a reasonable patient would have refused needed medical
treatment simply because the physician would later use his body

304. Id. at 791. See also Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1550-55 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (in
a wrongful conception case, testimony of the patient that she would not have undergone the proposed
treatment if she had been informed of the risk was not necessary to bring the causation issue to the

jury under the Canterbury rule, but patient's reasons for undergoing sterilization were relevant to
damages).
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
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Canterbury,464 F.2d at 791.
See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979).
Id. See Studer, supra note 301.
705 P.2d 37 (Hawaii App. 1985).
Id. at 47.
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cells or tissues in research."' In reality, the objective standard
may not be the most appropriate measure of causation in a case
such as Moore, where the physician's lack of disclosure injures the
patient's personal autonomy or decision-making ability rather than
his physical body.311
Viewed in this light, the Moore Court's holding on the
informed consent issue is somewhat of a Pyrrhic victory for Moore.
That is, although Moore is free to pursue a cause of action based
on lack of informed consent, the objective test of causation may be
an insurmountable obstacle to recovery. However, focusing on the
physician's breach of fiduciary duty suggests another way of
approaching the causality problem for Moore on rehearing.
D. A Constructive Trust Remedy
Due to the inherent difficulty in proving causation under an
objective standard in an action for lack of informed consent, a
Moore-type plaintiff may be unable to recover on that cause of
action. However, a careful reading of the Moore case suggests
another remedy.312
The Moore court held that the physician's failure to disclose his
personal or research interests to the patient violated the physician's
fiduciary duty.31 3 Fiduciary responsibilities are imposed in many
areas of the law, and a strict standard of disclosure is consistently

310. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 180,793 P.2d 479,520,
271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 187 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Most cases would be dismissed following a motion
for nonsuit for failure to prove proximate cause. Id.
311. See Shultz, supra note 299 at 250 (discussing the theory that choices made by "reasonable
others" are not proper guidelines when the issue is personal autonomy).
312. One author has suggested that Moore's claim for unjust enrichment may provide an
alternative remedy. See Traynor, The Unjust Enrichment Claim In Moore v. Regents, 9 BIOTEcH. L.
REP. 240 (1990) (discussing the principle of restitution as applied to Moore's claim of unjust
enrichment).
313. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 132, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152. The Court noted that
the term "fiduciary" as used in this context did not operate to make the physician a financial adviser
to the patient. Id. at 131, n.10, 793 P.2d at 485, n.10, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152, n.10.
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required of fiduciaries.3 14 In addition, it was held in Remillard
Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.315 that a fiduciary may not
profit unfairly from his relationship to the cestui que trust.3 6 In
Remillard, the defendant directors held majority voting control of
a manufacturing corporation. 317 The defendants formed a whollyowned sales corporation and contracted with the manufacturing
corporation to market the product at a large profit to
themselves. 318 The Remillard court held that the defendant
fiduciaries were precluded from receiving any personal benefit
absent fullest disclosure and consent of the parties involved. 319
The powers of a fiduciary are constantly subject to the
equitable limitation that these powers may not be exercised for
personal gain at the expense of the cestuis.320 If this limitation is
exceeded, equity will provide a remedy. 321 One equitable remedy
322
for a breach of fiduciary duty is a decree of constructive trust.
A constructive trust imposes an equitable duty on the errant
fiduciary to convey the property to the cestui as restitution for the
fiduciary's wrongdoing. 3' The cause of action itself is not based

314. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assoc., 204 Cal.
App. 3d 819, 835,251 Cal. Rptr. 530,534 (1988) (trustee owes to the beneficiary the duty of fullest
disclosure of all material facts); Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1148,217 Cal. Rptr. 89,
103 (1985) (attorney owes client full and fair disclosure of all facts which materially affect his rights
and interests).
315. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
316. Id. at 419, 241 P.2d at 74.
317. Id. at 408-12, 241 P.2d at 68-72.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 419, 241 P.2d at 74. The court noted that directors bear a fiduciary relationship to
the corporation and the stockholders. Id. Further, even if the statutory conditions for an interested
transaction are met, transactions that are not fair and reasonable to the corporation may be set aside.
Id.
320. Id. at 421, 241 P.2d at 75.
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., Ringo v. Binns, 35 U.S. 269,280 (1836) (agent who uses defect in principal's
title to land to acquire title for himself will be considered as a trustee holding for his principal).
323. See RBsTATmmENT (SEcOND) OP TRUSTS § 1 comment (e) (1959) which states in pertinent
part:
[A] constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property subjecting the person by
whom the title to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that his acquisition or retention of the property is wrongful and that he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the property .. . [A] constructive trust is
imposed, not to effectuate intention, but to redress wrong or unjust enrichment.
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on the establishment of a trust; it is composed of the breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, or other wrongdoing which entitles the
plaintiff to equitable relief. 24 A constructive trust remedy may
be compelled in virtually any case where there is a wrongful
acquisition or detention of property to which another is
entitled. 32 5 Additionally, a court of equity has great latitude in
decreeing a constructive trust and may shape the remedy to fit the
transaction. 26
Since the gravamen of the constructive trust remedy is to
prevent the wrongful conduct of the defendants, that remedy would
seem to lend itself to a case like Moore. A pleading for
constructive trust would shift the court's focus from the plaintiff's
injury, which may be difficult to prove, to the defendant's breach
of fiduciary duty and lack of disclosure, which are more easily
established.
The constructive trust decree typically grants to the injured
party the entire profit derived from the defendant's misconduct.
The award is considered a windfall to the plaintiff and is not
calculated as economic recompense for the injury. Under this
theory, Moore's likelihood of recovery would increase since he
would not be required to prove causation on the lack of informed
consent issue. Instead, Moore would have to demonstrate that his

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1(e) (1959). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2224 (West Supp.
1991) (one who gains a thing by wrongful act becomes the trustee of the thing gained for the benefit
of one who would otherwise have had it).
324. Weiss v. Marcus, 51 Cal. App. 3d 590, 600, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (1975). The
pleadings must demonstrate the defendant's wrongful act, not the establishment of a trust. Id.
325. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 700 (1985), rev'd on other grounds,
773 F.2d 477 (1985) (person receiving confidential information from another and misappropriating
it for personal gain holds the proceeds of the misappropriation in constructive trust); Haskel
Engineering & Supply Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 78 Cal. App. 3d 371, 376, 144
Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (1978) (employer was entitled to impose constructive trust on property acquired
by employee with embezzled funds); Rdke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 100-01,490 P.2d 805, 808,
98 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296-97 (1971) (failure to perform a valid contract between spouses regarding
testamentary disposition of property constitutes constructive fraud justifying imposition of
constructive trust); Edwards-Town, Inc. v. Dimin, 9 Cal. App. 3d 87, 94-95, 87 Cal. Rptr. 726, 73031 (1970) (subsequent purchaser who acquired parcels of real estate with knowledge of prior
purchaser's agreement that a percentage of the sales price was to be placed in a bank account in
exchange for release of vendor's lien, and that prior purchasers had not paid for the property, was
held constructive trustee of the designated funds).
326. Edwards-Town, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
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physician had a personal interest in Moore's treatment and that the
physician failed to disclose that interest to Moore prior to obtaining
Moore's consent.327 The burden of proof would then shift to the
defendant physician to justify his conduct.328
Justice Mosk's final attack on the nondisclosure remedy was
that it could not be used to reach defendants not standing in a
fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff.329 Therefore, unless a
patient could put forth a showing of secondary liability, he would
be unable to recover against any defendant other than the treating
physician; researchers, other physicians, and pharmaceutical
companies would be insulated from liability.33 ' It is possible that
the constructive trust remedy could be used to reach non-fiduciary
defendants as well, since there are indications that a fiduciary
relationship is not a prerequisite to imposition of a constructive
3 31

trust.

327. See Van de Kamp v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust., 204 Cal. App. 3d 819, 853,251 Cal.
Rptr. 530,546 (1988) (beneficiary has initial burden of proving the existence and breach of fiduciary
duty, the burden then shifts to the trustee to justify actions).
328. Id. See also Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 420,
241 P.2d 66, 75 (1952) (burden is on director to prove fairness of interested transaction).
329. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 181,793 P.2d 479,521,
271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 188 (1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
330. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). In Moore's case, only Dr. Golde would be directly liable. Id.
The Regents, Quan, GI and Sandoz could be attacked only by showing agency. Id. The majority
apparently did not believe that Moore had adequately alleged secondary liability, although an express
ruling was not made on this question. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) Justice Mosk also wrote to
"disassociate [himself) completely from the amateur biology lecture that the majority impose on us
throughout their opinion." Id. at 182-85, 793 P.2d at 521-23, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 188-90 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). The dissenter found that this material was improperly included in the majority opinion
because, inter alia, the appeal was taken on sustained demurrers, therefore, the record was absent of
evidence on the medical topics, and without expert testimony in the record, the Court was not
competent to discuss medical science. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
331. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 268 U.S. 121, 132 (1925) (beneficiary of trust may
follow property into hands of all but innocent purchasers for value); People v. Howes, 99 Cal. App.
2d 808, 817, 222 P.2d 969, 975 (1950) (owner of stolen property sold by thief may impose
constructive trust on proceeds); Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133, 136 (1877) (owner of negotiable
securities, stolen and subsequently sold to defendants with notice, was entitled to trust in proceeds
so long as proceeds could be traced and regardless of absence of fiduciary relationship).
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CONCLUSION

The case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California
leaves open a number of questions about the breadth of the
informed consent doctrine in cases involving commercial and
research use of human cells.33 The decision certainly increases
the scope of the informed consent doctrine by requiring a physician
to disclose the physician's personal interests in a patient's
treatment. The Moore decision also grants a patient greater control
over the use that will be made of the patient's excised cells.
However, the long term ramifications for patients, physicians and
researchers of mandating this greater disclosure have yet to be
seen. As the demand for human cell sources increases, it seems
likely that new cases similar to Moore will arise. Perhaps these
future cases will find an equitable method of balancing the
commercial and research needs of the medical community with the
healthcare and financial needs of the patient community and society
as a whole.
Luisa A.M. Giuffrida

332. The case also presents compelling questions about whether property rights should be
recognized in the human body. Since that question was answered negatively by the California
Supreme Court, a detailed discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this Note. A number of
commentaries have been written on the subject following the Court of Appeals decision in Moore.
See, e.g., Comment, Spleen forSale: Moore v. Regents of the University of California and the Right
to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIo ST. LI.. 499 (1990); Note, Ownership ofHuman Tssue: Life
After Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 75 VA. L REv. 1363 (1989); Danforth, Cells,
Sales and Royalties: The Patient'sRight to a Portionof the Profits,6 YALE L & Poicy REv. 179
(1988); Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986).
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